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LETTER

TO THE

PEOPLE of *ENGLAND*,

UPON THE

MILITIA, &c.

1757



LETTER



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A
LETTER
TO THE
PEOPLE of *ENGLAND*,
UPON THE
MILITIA,
CONTINENTAL CONNECTIONS,
NEUTRALITIES,
AND
SECRET EXPEDITIONS.

Hic est, aut nusquam, quod quærimus. HOR.

Multa putans, sortemque animo miseratus iniquam. VIRG. ÆN.

LONDON:
Printed for J. Scot in *Paternoster-row*, 1757.

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
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VIRG. AN.
HON.






LONDON:

Printed for J. St. John in Paternoster-row, 1757.



A
LETTER
TO THE
People of *England, &c.*

 F it were necessary to make an
 Apology for this Address, I might
 inform you, my Countrymen,
that the ill Success of the executive Part
of the Militia Bill; the fatal Effects of
our late Continental Measures; the men-
acing Aspect of certain Neutralities, and
the Fate of our *Secret Expedition*, admitted
of sufficient Excuse for the penning of
this Letter, which, without the Acrimony
of Party Zeal, dares speak Truth *for its*
own sake, and make such Observations
upon it, as, I flatter myself, will shew
you in a clear Light, your present Situa-

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tion ; and by the Pursuit of what Measures you are likely to continue a free and independent People.

WHEN we consider how clamorous every anti-ministerial and unconstitutional Paper was for a *Militia*, with what Rage these Authors exclaimed against the *Game Act*, which divested the Subjects of the Use of Arms, and how they insinuated that the Militia Bill was procrastinated in 1756, in the House of Lords, in order to prevent us defending ourselves against our Enemies, that Mercenaries might be call'd over, and they have the Appearance of Utility : When we reflect with what becoming Zeal every Address to the Throne implored, and every Instruction to our Representatives recommended a *national Militia*,——and when we consider with what true Joy every British Heart exulted, at reading his Majesty's Royal Recommendation for framing one, to his Parliament——Can it be credited that we ourselves should oppose it?——will it be believed by Posterity that Britons, who had long solicited the Use
of

of Arms, after being indulg'd by their Representatives, by their Parliament and King, the free Exercise of them—in a time of open War—when the Enemy was at the Gate, and threatned Destruction to every the remotest Province—refused to accept them for their own Defence, and prevent Foreigners (who under the specious Pretence of defending, might subvert their Constitution) being called even for their Protection—whom they had already experienced, to be a heavy—a disagreeable—a dangerous Burden? No future Historians may relate the Event, but in vain will they endeavour to be credited—it will be looked upon as fabulous!

If we view the Matter in an æconomical Light, we shall be more enamoured with it. If we have not sufficient martial Courage and Bravery, animating our Hearts—small Remnant, of that noble glorious Blood of our Ancestors! — to excite us to act like Men, for Honour and our Reputation sakes, let Frugality plead the Cause of an almost Bankrupt Nation.

Will not our Necessities point out to us the Use of Arms for our Defence, to save what we otherwise must spend in Mercenaries? Is not Bread at a sufficiently high Price? Would the Importation of Thirty Thousand Foreigners reduce or increase it? and who knows how soon the *French* may make a Descent upon this Island, as a Diversion for the Queen of *Hungary* in *Germany*, as we must then be obliged to call over our *Hessians*, and what other Mercenaries we can engage in our pay to protect us? Answer these Queries to yourselves ye head-strong *Englishmen*, who oppose the framing of a Militia!

BUT let us examine into the Pretext of opposing the Execution of this Law. I have made much Enquiry, and I can find none that goes beyond "the Inability you have of sparing the Time requisite for perfecting you in the Use of Arms", strange Infatuation! Would you not rather spare Twenty Days in a Year for the Exercise of Arms, though it were at the Price of your Days Work, than labour all your Life for a Tyrant—who—would not only
 IIIW 8 A make

make you Fight for him when and where he pleased, but pay you what he pleased? Would you not give Three † Half Crowns for insuring your Wives—your Daughters from the Brutality of Tygers, yourselves from Death, and your Posterity from Popery and Slavery?

THUS then the Pretext for dissenting to the Execution of the Militia Act, is shewn to be an Argument in it's Favour—and indeed, now that Act has been so much amended, and those Clauses which were before disagreeable (particularly to the Dissenters,)* are rectified, it is avowing oneself a professed Jacobite, an Enemy to our Constitution in Church and State, to be any wise instrumental in preventing so salutary a Law taking Place—It is true I believe, many of you my Countrymen, who compose the giddy Multitude that oppose, it are Friends to the Constitution—but you think not for yourselves

† A Gentleman at *Newcastle* freed every one that gave him that Sum, from serving in the Militia, *Vide* all the public Papers.

* Among others that for exercising on *Sundays*.

yourselfes—you take Reports for Facts, and credit Hearsays—and those who set them first Abroad, are such as I represent them—*Enemies to their Country*. Think for yourselfes, examine the Act with Attention—consider the State of the Nation—the Dangers that threaten us—the most probable Means of extricating ourselves from the present Dilemma—and if you can get the better of your former Prejudices, you will view this Bill in the most favourable of Lights—you will see that it was intended to qualify you to protect your Country, your Liberties—and to prepare you for a daring Enemy, who has long looked upon this Nation with the Eye of Malevolence, and only waits for a favourable Opportunity, to wrest from you every thing that is dear to you and your Posterity.

As to a most invidious Report, that you are to be sent Abroad; as occasion may require; it seems to carry with it many Marks of its original Manufacture—it has the Stamp of *French Politics* upon it, as consigned to some jesuitic Emissary here,

here for public Vent. If such Reports as these gain Ground, what may we not expect to find credited, since in contravention of the public Faith of an Act of Parliament, which has never yet been violated, you are taught to believe you are to be transported like Felons at the Nod of a prime Minister?—How different is the Intent of the Act, since you are not even to go out of your own County, but in Case of actual Invasion—which may never happen, if you are unanimous in acquiring the Use of Arms; for it is your Ignorance in this Respect, that flatters the *French* with the Hopes of an easy Conquest—resolve but once to be as expert as they in the Field of Battle, and the darkest Nights and most South-Westerly Winds, that may keep our Ships in Harbour, will never intice them to make a Descent upon this Island. Need you then be under any Apprehension of being separated from your Family or your Friends, since you are never to be sent out of the Kingdom upon any Account whatever—since you cannot even be called out of your County but in Time of open Rebellion,

bellion, which surely none of you would hesitate to oppose with your Lives and Properties—since if it were to succeed there is an end to both—and as Six Miles are the farthest Extent of travelling upon exercise Days?

WHAT, then, are the Hardships you complain of? Is there any Partiality in the Case? Is not every one of us, from the Age of Eighteen to Fifty, equally obliged to serve? (the Exception is so trifling, it would be vague to argue it) and would you not rather trust your Country, your Religion, your Liberties, your Wives, your Families, — and yourselves in the Hands of these, your Countrymen, Superiors and Equals, Men of Property and Probity, all interested in the general Weal, —rather than to a Rabble of Mercenaries, either Natives, or Foreigners—they that fight for Hire, may as well be Enemies as Friends—a Penny a Day more in their Wages may ballance the Scale. Think of the Trust you repose in them—think of the trivial Object that may bias their Integrity.

THIS,

THIS, then, is the Burden you labour under—*You are to defend yourselves, against an open an avowed Enemy, that threatens Destruction—to your King—your Country—your Religion—your Liberties—your Property—your Wives—your Families—your selves—in a Word to every Thing that is dear to you!*—Consider, my Countrymen, what was the Situation of your Ancestors in a State of *Vassalage*—were they not obliged to fight for their *Barons*—not for *themselves*—to combat for *Tyrants*—not for *Liberty*?—what a Contrast!

BUT after all, I will humour your Prejudices, and own your Complaints are just—What Chance do you stand of serving in the Militia? not a greater than you would of getting a Prize in a Lottery where there were *a Hundred Blanks* to a *Prize*, and you had but one Ticket. I have already mentioned the small Sum for which many of you have been so soon rid of all your Fears; let us now enquire whether there are no immediate and, what may be called, pecuniary Advantages, attendant upon a Militia Man—Is being ex-

empted from all Statute Work, and from serving either as Peace or Parish Officer none? Is being enfranchised from bearing Arms in his Majesty's Land-forces ; is being entitled to set up any Trade, in any Part of the Kingdom (except the Universities) no Advantages? they are such as entitle you *Freemen* in every Sense.

BUT surely as *Britons*, as Lovers of our Country, we can view this Act in a more extensive Light, than merely as it relates to our immediate Self-interest. If we can protect ourselves, without the Aid of Mercenaries, we save the Government so much Money as they would otherwise spend in them, for that Purpose, and which may be properly applied to annoy the Enemy at Home or in her Colonies. Besides we cannot always have Troops for Hire upon an Emergency ; the last Rebellion was a fatal Experience of it, and the Loss of *Minorca*, and our ill Success in the Mediterranean, as well as in *America* can be attributed to nothing else, but the Necessity we were under of detaining here a sufficient Number of Men of War and
Troops

Troops for our own Security (which, if we had then been fortified with a National Militia, there would have been no Occasion for) while they were absolutely necessary abroad. This we seem to have been thoroughly sensible of, by our Instructions to our Representatives, at the Time of our ill Success, in so warmly recommending a *regular Militia*.

Thus, then, have I endeavoured to evince from Truth, without Sophistry or the Parade of Argument, the *Necessity, Utility, Impartiality, and Advantages*, of the Execution of the Militia Bill,—which though imperfect, as the Work of Man, is liable to as few exceptions as any Act, that ever yet was framed into a Law by King, Lords, and Commons.

I shall now consider the Interest of *England*, protected with such a Militia as this Act proposes, in regard to continental Connections.

HOWEVER sanguine the *French* may appear, to fight the Battles of the Queen of
Hungary

Hungary in *Germany*; it requires but little Reflexion to recollect that that Jealousy which rendered the Interests of the House of *Austria* and that of *Bourbon* opposite for so many Years, can never be reconciled by any Alliance whatever. *France* will never add to the Possessions of that House, sufficiently to make her formidable to herself, or to recover the Crown of *Spain*. Yet that Balance we have lavished so many Millions away to keep in equipoize; that Balance which has run us Eighty Millions in Debt, taxed every Necessary of Life, and mortgaged the Produce; that Balance which engaged us in 1701. in the *grand Alliance*, by which it was stipulated that Hostilities should not cease, 'till the House of *Bourbon* had disunited from *Spain*, and that Crown had been fixed upon *Charles VIth's* Head—that Balance which made us not fulfil our Engagements in the *grand Alliance*, in order to prevent the Imperial Diadem, and the Crowns of *Spain*, the two *Sicilies* and *Sardinia* centering in one Person—is now no more! It may be asked then, why are we engaged in a continental War?

Was

Was it to protect *Hanover*, which might have gained an *equally* advantageous *Neutrality* with that lately concluded, without unsheathing the Sword? Was it to assist the King of *Prussia*, and support the protestant Interest of *Germany*?

INDEED at the Time of our Alliance with the King of *Prussia*, the *Czarina* was engaged in a subsidiary Treaty with us, and might be looked upon as our Friend if not Ally; but so it has happened that those very *Russians* that were paid by us to wait for our Command upon the Frontiers of *Poland*, have marched and acted against us, and our Allies. This is a sample of the Faith of Courts, and evinces how far they are to be relied upon, when their Interests change. However, this does not prove any great Foresight in the then Adm——n, for even if the *Czarina* had assisted us and our Allies with the Number of Troops she engaged to march in our Favour, we should not have been able to oppose the Houses of *Bourbon* and *Austria* upon the Continent. Whenever we separate the Empress Queen and the
King

King of *Prussia*, which soever sides with *France* against us, will be too many for us and our Allies. This the last War—this the present War evince. Why then instead of engaging *Russians* to fight for us, which they never intended, did not we gain the Queen of *Hungary* as well as the King of *Prussia* in our Interest, if we looked upon ourselves as obliged to protect *Germanic* Interests, or thought continental Connections were useful to establish our *American* Rights? Rights which should have been settled so early as the Year thirteen at the Treaty of *Utrecht*, when the Resources of all the Powers of *Europe* were exhausted by a twelve Year's War, which was as profuse of Treasure as of Blood; and which succeeding other Wars, that were diversified only by faint Shadows of Peace, had brought all the Powers, and particularly *France* (whose Provinces had fallen a Prey, during the whole War, to foreign Armies on both Sides), to a State of Impotence in Arms, and they were no longer able to do Mischief—had we then settled the Boundaries of our *American* Colonies, and particularly that of *Nova-Scotia*;

Scotia ; or had we at the Treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle* had Prudence enough to have foreseen the Consequence of referring the Limits to the Decision of Commissaries at *Paris*, we should not now be emerged in so expensive and unsuccessful a War—and which, there is some Reason to fear, will never bring *France* to that State of Reason she was in at the Treaty of *Utrecht*, or even at that of *Aix-la-Chapelle*, but such was our want of Discernment, that after Seven Years Negotiation, the Commissaries effected nothing ; the very Countries in Dispute are wrested from us—we go to War and spend Twelve Millions to recover them—but instead of regaining them, we have already added the Loss of much more important Possessions to them.

THE Guaranty of the Treaty of *Westphalia*, is the Pretence for the IncurSION of the *French* into the Empire.—This Treaty which ascertains and should secure the civil and religious Rights of the Protestants in *Germany*, is the Pretext for its own Violation ! The *French* cross the *Rhine*, seize *Embsen*, and take *Hanover* for the

Preservation of the Liberties of the Empire! the *H—n—ns*, seemingly conscious of the Justice of their Cause, capitulate to the *French General*, when, instead of retiring to *Stade*, where they must be hemmed in on all Sides, if they had marched Eastward to *Welfenbottle* or *Brunswick*, they could have preserved the Communication with the *Prussian Territories*; and if they had been compelled to an entire Evacuation of those of *Hanover*, they might, with great Facility, have retreated into the Dutchy of *Magdeburgh*, where they would have been assisted by the King of *Prussia*, and might have acted in Concert with him; but by their retiring to *Stade*, they must have resolved to abandon the Interest of the King of *P—*, without waiting for the Consent of his *Britannic* * Majesty's Council, and Forty Thousand Men are to be left *inactive* during the whole War, when we stand in such great Need of them.

* Vide Lord *Holderness's* Letter to the foreign Ministers Resident here.

THIS step must undoubtedly attract the Attention of all the Powers of *Europe*, who will find some Difficulty to ascribe the true Cause of this political Phœnomenon; and we need not be surpris'd to find the King of P——a so nettled in his Letter *; nor need we wonder, notwithstanding the Answer that has been made him that *we shall inviolably fulfil our Engagements*, that he should pack up a Con-

* Je viens d'apprendre qu'il est encore question d'un Traité de Neutralité pour l'Electorat d'Hanovre. V. M. auroit elle assez peu de constance & de fermeté pour se laisser abbattre par quelques revers de Fortune? Les Affaires sont-elles si delabrées, qu'on ne puisse se retablir? Que V. M. fasse attention ala démarche qu'elle m'a fait faire. Elle est la cause des malheurs prêts à fondre sur moi. Je n'aurois jamais renoncé à l'Alliance de la France sans toutes les belles promesses qu'elle m'a faites. Je ne me repens point du traité que j'ai fait avec V. M. mais qu'elle ne m'abandonne point lâchement, à l'a merci de mes Ennemis, après avoir attiré toutes les forces de l'Europe contre moi. Je compte que V. M. se ressouviendra de ses engagemens réitérés le 26. du passé, et qu'elle n'entendra à aucun engagement que je n'y sois compris.

vention with *France*, compromise his Differences with the Queen of *Hungary*, evacuate *Saxony*, and leave us and the *French* to fight it out; and indeed this seems to be the most probable Event, as it is the current Report that Count *Podewils*, his Minister of State, is gone incognito to *Paris* upon that Errand,

IF we can secure *Hanover*, and make the K. of *P.* forget our Ungratefulness, or rather that of the *H——ns*, perhaps this Step might turn out more to our Advantage, than supporting his *P——n M——y* against the *French*, the Queen of *Hungary*, the *Czarina*, the King of *Sweden*, the Elector of *Saxony*, &c. For as we cannot send a sufficient Number of Troops into *Germany* to make Head against the *French*, upon their own Frontiers, and as they will never come to any decisive Action, but when it suits them, when they are not fighting for themselves; so all our Efforts upon the Continent without we were engaged in such grand Alliance as that of the Year 1701. (but without the Stipulations, that were there annexed) must

must be ineffectual and put us to a greater Expence than the Amount of any Advantages we can reap from them. Such an Alliance indeed, supported by us with pecuniary Assistance only, might be a Means of attracting sufficient Numbers of *French* Troops into the Empire to weaken their Nation, and prevent them sending such Reinforcements to *America* as would be able to make Head against us there.

In this Place I must take Notice of the Cause of the ill Success of our Expedition this Year upon *Cape-Breton*, which can be attributed to nothing else but the tardy Arrival of Admiral *Holbourn's* Fleet in *America*; for it is not owing to the Superiority of the *French* Fleet, † in that Part of the World, as some have imagined, but to the *French* Fleet being possessed of *Louisbourg* Harbour, from whence

† We have Nineteen Ships of the Line, and Eighteen Frigates in *America*, and the *French* have only Eighteen Ships of the Line, and Seven Frigates there.

whence there is no driving them; but if our Fleet were to Winter in *America* this Year, we doubt not but they would be possessed of *Cape-Bréton* next Spring, as the *French* Fleet cannot Winter there.

BUT to return to the Affairs of the Continent. The Death of *Lewis* the XIVth. was soon followed by an Alliance, long sought after, between *Great Britain* and *France*. From hence arose a System, which had all the Appearance of Inconsistency, and from whence nothing but the Embarrassments which have since succeeded, could have been produced; The Regency of *France* were far from favouring the Views of the *Spanish* Ministry, and *Great Britain* devoted herself entirely to the Designs and Interests of the Emperor, the Increase of whose Power and Forces could furnish no favourable Prognostics to *France*. The Affinity of Blood, and the private Interest of the Duke Regent clashed: This gave Birth to new Measures, some of which strengthened, while others destroy'd former Maxims. What was the Consequence?

The

The Regent was so closely connected with England, that Spain declared War against the Emperor in the *Mediterranean*, where Hostilities against a Power that had no Navy could not fail being successful. The *French* took up Arms in Favour of the hereditary Enemy of that Crown, against the first Prince of their own Blood—against a King that they themselves had settled upon the Throne, even at the Expence of their own Blood—at the Price of their own Treasures. *France*, as Ally of the House of *Austria*, made such Conquests against *Spain*, as if she had been governed by a Descendent of *Charles V.* and *England*, which now Re-echoes with having made the House of *Austria* too powerfull, though she no longer possesses the Crowns of *Sicily* and *Naples*, procured her the second Possession of them.—Thus we see what Jealousy and Interest will operate upon *France*—and surely the Empress Queen cannot be so far lost to all sense of Gratitude, as not to listen to the Proposal of an advantageous Alliance, which might be offered, especially when she considers how much she

she is the Dupe of *France*, whose Interest it is to diminish instead of aggrandize the House of *Austria*, to never enter earnestly in her Quarrels, but only excite her and the rest of *Germany* to cut each others Throats, that in the End they may separately fall an easier Prey to the Arms and Ambition of *France*—who never forgets that *Charlemagne Lewis I. Charles II. Lewis II. and Charles III.* were Emperors of *Germany*, and that *Lewis XV.* is their Successor.

But if these Considerations should have no Weight with the *Empress Queen*—our Fleet in the Mediterranean might bring her back to that Reason, to that Justice from which she has lately so far swerved; surely we cannot be afraid of being put under the Ban of the Empire—if so, how came we to pretend to assist the King of *Prussia* against the House of *Austria*?

It will be scarce credited in History, that a Nation, that had 300 Men of War in good Condition, 250 of which were always in Commission, and might be ready to
put

put to Sea in a few Days, had need court any Power of Europe into her Alliance, when all the Powers of Europe together could scarce produce such an Armament ---will it be believed that half a dozen rotten *Russian* Ships should ride four Months Triumphant in the *Baltic*, to oppose the Commerce and Navigation of our only Ally? Will it be credited that *Osborn* did not bombard *Leghorn* with the Fleet he has in the *Mediterranean*, while the Emperor was putting the King of *Prussia* under the Ban of the Empire, ransacking his Towns, pillaging his Provinces—alienating his Subjects?—However inconsistent our Conduct may hitherto appear, in regard to continental Measures; every Briton is at length convinced that *Vigorous ones* are to be pursued—an *Armament* greater than ever Sailed from *England*, is prepared at *Portsmouth*----and ready at *Spithead* some Weeks----nay Months----but why is it detained there? not to give the Enemy an Opportunity of gaining Intelligence of it's Destination—for there are but Two *Persons* in *England* that are acquainted with it—but to wait the

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Arrival

Arrival of the Transports—from the Downs, detained by contrary westerly Winds—as they cannot Sail over the Flats, and as none are to be got at Southampton, Cowes, Weymouth, Pool, Newport, or any where in the Neighbourhood, or to the West of Portsmouth.

At length the Transports get round—the Fleet Sails upon a—*secret Expedition!* various are the Conjectures of it's Destination—*Brest* is to be taken—the *French Fleet* there demolished—the *Magazines* burnt---the *Ammunition* destroyed---the *Fortifications* rased---*Minorca* is to be recovered---*Toulon* to be Bombarded---*Martinico* to be subdued---the whole *Coast* of *Choramandel* to be submitted to the *English*----no such thing----think you so formidable an * Armament is to be employed

* It was composed of *Eighteen* Ships of the Line, Six Frigates, Two Bomb Ketches, Two Fire Ships, Two Hospital Ships, Forty-four Transports, and Six Cutters; the best Manned and conditioned, and

employed upon such *insignificant Errands?*
 ----The *Isle* of AIX, in the Bay of
Biscay, *Five Miles in circumference*, is to
 be *besieged*----is to be *carried*---- and all
 our *hopes*--all our *wishes* are consummated
 ----*it is taken*----the Governor, and all
 the Garrison, composed of 600 Men, are
 made Prisoners, and brought away with
Forty eight Mortars, and *Thirty Guns*—
 which we have from the *best Authority*—
 the *London Gazette*.

NEVERTHELESS there are some dissatis-
 fied People, who complain that this Con-
 quest is not equal to the Expence of the
 Armament—(which cannot be supputed
 at above a *Million and Half*)—and
 imagine it was intended to make a
 Descent upon the Coast of *France*. Indeed

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by

and the most powerful in the Navy;
 having on Board, besides Ten Regiments
 compleat, a large Train of Artillery, and
 immense Quantities of Stores, Provisions,
 and Ammunition.

by Gen^l M^d's † Orders, given on Board the *Ramilies* the 15th September, one would have believed that it was designed to make a Debarkation upon the Coast of *France*, if the Signal of

† When the Ships come to an Anchor in order to Land, the Colonels are immediately to join their respective Corps. The Grenadiers and detached Companies, will probably be the First to Land, and are therefore to be the First in Readiness, then the Battalions according to their Rank, or as they may happen to be most conveniently situated. Every Ship will send Officers in their Boats, in proportion to their Men. The Soldiers are to have Two good Flints, and Thirty-six rounds of Ammunition; except the Grenadiers and detached Companies, who are to have double proportion. The First Body that Lands must have an Engineer and Intrenching Tools with them; and they must take their own Hatchets, and Bill-hooks, Two Days provision of Biscuit and

of the 19th. in the Evening, for the whole Fleet (which was yet upwards of twenty Leagues from the Land a-head) to lay to, notwithstanding the Wind was fair, and the

Cheese and their Flasks. The Ships of the same Regiments, will come to Anchor as near as possible to each other. Six Days Provision of Biscuit, Cheese, and Beef to be procured for all the Troops ready to send on Shore, after the Men are landed. The light Artillery is to be landed as soon as possible. The Boats of the Ordnance Ships (which Ships should likewise anchor near together) are solely to be employed in conveying the Artillery and intrenching Tools on Shore. When the Troops have possessed themselves of a Post on Shore the chief Engineer marks out an Entrenchment to secure the Provisions, Stores, heavy Artillery, Powder and other Things necessary for the Army. Then all the Tents, Blankets, Watch-coats, Knapfacks, Remainder of the intrenching Tools, spare Ammunition, Provisions,

the Night clear, *did not evince the contrary.* And this will appear still more evident, if we consider that, after having made ourselves Masters of AIX (which some pretend could as easily have been done, with

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visions, Scaling-Ladders, Petards, &c. are to be brought on Shore, that *no Time may be lost in prosecuting the Enterprize.* To be carried on Shore after the Men are landed; the Mens Knapfacks, a Tent, two Blankets, and a Kettle for eight Men. A Soldier's Tent for the Officers of a Company. All those Tents must, when the Army marches, be carried by the Soldiers, 'till better Means can be had. A Soldier to have only one Shirt, one Pair of Shoes, and one Pair of Stockings in his Knapfack. No Women to be allowed to come on Shore 'till ordered by the General. A careful Person to be left in every Transport, to take Charge of the Baggage belonging to the Officers and Men 'till it is called for. Upon all Occasions, where it is supposed the Enemy can be
got

a *Twenty-gun Ship* as with the whole Armament, as it is said, I suppose to support the Credibility of this Assertion, that it was *entirely defenceless* five Days were spent in Councils of War, to judge of the Expediency

got at, the Lieutenant General commands that the Corps which are directed to attack them, do march vigorously up, that they reserve their Fire 'till they come very near. Upon every Opportunity, the General Orders the Troops to run in upon the Enemy with their Bayonets, in which Method of Attack, *the superior Strength and Courage of the British Troops must meet with Success. The Troops may expect to find a Number of Militia of the Country upon the Shore, which they will easily disperse.* The short 3 Pounders, the short 6 Pounders, and all the Howitzers are the first Artillery, which will be called for; and therefore to be got in Readiness, as soon as the Ships come to an Anchor. Officers of the Navy will be appointed to direct the Boats that carry the Men on Shore, and the

pediency of—*returning to England*—they could not deliberate upon the *Practicability of landing their Troops*, since the General was so well apprized of there being nothing but † *such a Militia to oppose them, as they would easily disperse*. But at the End of these five Days, when the *French* had been sufficiently alarmed, and they had taken all imaginable Precaution to prevent our Descent with Success—such as planting Cannon, so as to make it, for many Miles one continued Battery—collecting their Troops, and making two separate Encampments—it was then judged expedient, at *four Miles* from Shore, to detach separately the Grenadiers

the Officers of the Land Forces are to take Care that the Orders given by these Gentlemen, to the Boats Crews are strictly obeyed. The Boats will be ranged by Divisions under their respective Commanders. All Soldiers that are unfit for Duty are to be left on board their Transports.

† Vide the preceding Orders.

diers and piquet Companies in the Men of War's Boats, to make a Debarkation upon the Continent---which Troops must have maintained their Ground six or seven Hours before they could (or, I suppose *had need*) be assisted by a second Disembarkation,---there being no Hopes of a Retreat, as the Boats were to row immediately back, in order to carry the other Troops.

THIS, it is imagined by some ill-natured, and perhaps, disaffected, Politicians, was to try the Disposition of the Troops; as they would insinuate, that if our Soldiers had testified the least Dissatisfaction, at being detached, *in such a Manner*, and after *such Retardment*, our Gen——ls would have pleaded "that as a sufficient Excuse for *not attempting to land* (which the *London Gazette* assures us was the Case). But as our Troops manifested the greatest Desire of making a Descent, and as they were sent off in this manner, all these fine spun Conjectures of our critical Politicians amount to *nothing*. It is true, after four Hours rowing, they were recalled—and

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the *Result of Five Days Deliberations*, was found *erroneous*, in that short Space of Time—even without summoning a *Council of War*—so necessary for the Decision of all *important Measures*.

BUT it is Time to be serious—this, then, is the *Event* of our *famous Expedition*! An Expedition that alarmed all *Europe*—frightened our Enemies and flattered our Allies, with such an important Stroke, as would give a new Face to our Affairs, and either enable us to conduct the War with Glory, or produce an honourable *Peace*—and, indeed, some pretend that a *Peace* may be the Consequence of it—be it so, if it prove an honourable one.—But surely the original Destination of this Armament, could never have been changed by any Remonstrances of the Court of *Spain*—could we have been afraid that in attacking *St. Domingo* (because the *Spaniards* have Possessions upon the Island, whereon it is situated) we should have provoked the *Spaniards* to declare War against us? If so, perhaps, we were afraid of landing at *Rochefort*, be-
cause

cause it is upon the same Continent as *Madrid*. Is it the *Friendship* of *Spain* that has had sufficient Weight in the Scale of our Judgment, to render infructuous this Expedition? Their Impartiality is so manifest, we have Reason to hope for its Continuance, though perhaps we shall not have another *Duc de Pentbievre* carried to *Cadiz*, to determine the Legality of the *Capture*, when the *Spaniards* shall be interested *one third* in the *Cargo*—Perhaps we shall not have another Captain of a Privateer, whose Judgment will direct him, in such a Circumstance to *Cales*, when *the same Wind* that will carry him there, will carry him to *Gibraltar*.

BUT if we could even suppose, that the Reason we did not make a *descent* at *Rochefort*, was because it is situated upon the same *Continent* as *Spain*---that would not account for our not attacking the *Hardi* (French) Man of War, which sailed some Hours in Company with our Fleet, and was not then *within Gun-shot* of the *Land*.---It is true, we detached four Ships after her---but she had than got into the
Garonne

Garronne---and, according to the preceding Manner of Reasoning, would not then have been a *legal Capture*.

HOWEVER I would be inclined to believe that the M---ry ought not to share the blame of this *ill-executed Expedition*---whatever the *first destination* of the Armament might be, for would it not be absurd to imagine that our Gen---ls were instructed to lay in-active five Days before *Rocheport*, to give the French Time to oppose them?---would it not be ridiculous to suppose that our Ad---l was ordered to let the French Ship pass---or, blow up half a dozen of our Seaman, (as has been positively asserted) upon the Isle of *Aix*, in destroying the Fortifications, to give the Enterprize an Air of Importance?---We may I think, then, reasonably conclude that the Commanders in Chief, were ordered, when they set out, to make a descent at *Rocheport*.

BUT I believe no one will pretend to deny, that the *Viper* Sloop sailed from *Plymouth* with Dispatches for Ad---l
H---ke,

H—ke, and that upon her meeting with the Fleet in the Bay, all farther Deliberations were laid aside; and whether, or no the *Ad—l* wrote to the *Gen—l*, to enquire if he had any further Occasion for His Majesty's Fleet; if not he would return to England---this much is certain ---it did return,

If we are not informed of either the Cause, or Contents of those Dispatches, may we not reasonably conclude, that the same Reason, that in the last War, made our Fleet at *Gibraltar* remain *mild Spectators* of the *French Fleet*, when it passed them, in the *Gut*, and when they might have *taken, burnt, or destroyed* every one of the *Enemy's Ships*---has brought our Armament from the *Bay of Biscay* to *block up Portsmouth*, instead of *Rochefort*. It is true there was then, no *Convention of Neutrality*, which obliged *forty thousand Men in our Pay*, to lay down their Arms, and prevented them *assisting*, our only Ally, upon the Brink of being swallowed up, by the Number of his Enemies---but the same Place was in *Danger*; and
Philosophers

Philosophers tell us that the same Causes, always produce the like Effects, and where the Cause is not to be immediately discovered, we can only trace it by its Effects. If so, there is a most striking parallelarity in the Measures, (their Consequences)---they both reflect a great Lustre upon our Arms---they both do honour to our *Naval Expeditions*.

BUT to whatever Cause our ill Success may be ascribed, it is evident, my Country-Men, you can trust none but yourselves for your Protection: This demonstrates, still farther, the *Necessity*, the *Utility*, of a *Militia*, and I shall conclude this Letter, with hoping that this *Institution* may have a more extensive Influence in our *Happiness* and *Prosperity* than is at first perceived---for dastardly *Commanders*, bad *Conductors*, and even venal and corrupt M---rs will dread the *Resentment* of a warlike People.

Postscript

P O S T S C R I P T.

Since the preceding Sheets went to the Press Mr. P——'s Letter to Adm. H—— and Gen——l M——t, made its Appearance in public; by which we are informed what Orders the V——p——r S——p carried from *him*——so that we imagine it only remains now for A—— H—— and G—— M—— to clear themselves by acquainting us by *what Orders* they returned to *Spithead*, since those contained in Mr. P——'s Letter were so expressly contrary; and in the Interim I submit the following Queries to you, in order to throw as much Light as possible upon this intricate Affair.

Query 1. Whether Mr. P——'s Letter which has been published, *comprised all the* Dispatches sent by the V——p——r?

Query

Query 2. Whether we were acquainted with the *Soundings* of the *French Coast*, before the Sailing of the Fleet; and whether the gaining that Intelligence may not be pleaded as an *Excuse* for their *Five Days Inaction*?

Query 3. Whether among the Pilots Lord *A*—— prepared for all *Parts of the World*, he did not omit those, acquainted with the *French Coast* in the Bay of *Biscay*?

Query 4. Whether the first *Destination* of this Armament was not changed, and any *Damage* we could have done the *French* at *Rockefort*, would have been equivalent to the *Expence* of fitting it out, &c?

Query 5. If the *C*——ders, in *Contravention* of their *last, real, and positive Orders*, returned to *Spithead*, when they should

(41)

should have remained in the *Bay*---we
may not expect that they will be soon
brought to public Trial for the same?

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

Page 5. l. 11. for *even*, read *over*. p.
7. l. 21. place the *comma* before *it*. p. 18.
l. 18. for *Interest*, read *Interests*. p. 20.
l. 10. for *might*, read *may*. *ibid*, l. 25.
after *such*, add *a*.

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may not expect that they will be soon
brought to public Trial for the same?

F I W I S



D R R A T A

Page 2. l. 11. for even, read even.
l. 12. place the comma before it. p. 18.
l. 18. for later, read further. p. 20.
l. 10. for might, read may. ibid. l. 25.
after each, add a.

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